


~~Top Secret~~

~~No Foreign Dissem~~



# STAFF NOTES:


## Chinese Affairs

~~Top Secret~~

135

December 23, 1974  
SC No. 09668/74

~~No Dissem Abroad  
Background Use Only  
Controlled Dissem~~



(b)(3)  
(S)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(3)  
(T)

## CHINESE AFFAIRS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

### CONTENTS

December 23, 1974

Views of Vladivostok ..... 3

(b)(3)  
(S)

(b)(3)  
(S)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(3)  
(T)

Views of Vladivostok

By all indications, Peking has chosen to play down the Vladivostok agreement on strategic arms as having little impact on the arms race and on international politics.

(b)(3)  
(T)

Chinese officials from the beginning have downgraded the accord arguing that it does not amount to a breakthrough and that it lacks the kind of controls required to make an arms limitation effective.

Peking

disparaged it as virtually meaningless in light of continued stockpiling and testing by the "super powers." China's first public acknowledgement was buried in an account of December 16 of Soviet missile testing, which charged that Soviet tests made a mockery of Moscow's claims that the Vladivostok agreement was a large step toward curbing the arms race.

(b)(3)  
(S)

Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, in an apparent allusion to the accord, said in a banquet speech on the 16th that the more the US and USSR contend for hegemony the more they play up detente in extravagant terms. Reiterating a long-standing Chinese line, Teng said that the Soviet-American detente in fact is aimed at covering up arms buildups and war preparations.

Earlier, Peking's domestic radio broadcast a highly ideological article which argued that competition between the US and USSR is fundamental, protracted, and absolute. With the Vladivostok agreement clearly in mind, the writer claimed that even though Moscow and Washington might reach agreements that serve their interests, this does not change their goal of overwhelming the other side, nor does it solve the contradictions in the US-USSR relationship.

December 23, 1974

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(3)  
(T)

The accuracy of this analysis is, of course, crucial to Chinese policy, and Peking in the past has reacted to important US-Soviet agreements in a way that clearly indicated China believed its interests had been adversely affected. Hints of this sort of reaction, however, have been absent from

(b)(3)  
(T)

Chinese commentary regarding both Secretary Kissinger's preparatory trip to Moscow in October and the Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok in late November. This suggests that Chinese statements regarding the agreement are an authentic gauge of Peking's attitude and that the Chinese apparently are not overly concerned that the Vladivostok agreement will prove harmful to Peking.

(b)(3)  
(T)

December 23, 1974

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~